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Abstract:  
One of the most important policy considerations currently for all governments across 
the EU concerns the need to increase tax revenue so as to reduce their unsustainable 
budget deficits. One key policy involves reducing the amount of revenue lost as a 
result of the ‘cash economy’, but before this is possible they first need to have some 
idea of its size. This study provides evidence of the importance of the cash economy 
across the EU and suggests that changes in house prices, when the Euro was formed 
in 1999 can be used as a basis to measure its magnitude. These results build on the 
theoretical model on how individuals who wished to hide their domestic cash from the 
authorities when the European single currency was formed in 1999, would have 
needed to acquire a physical asset, most likely property. This implies changes in 
property prices between the announcement of the Euro and its implementation reflect 
the level of wealth being hidden in this way and therefore the extent of the cash 
economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The prevalence of clandestine activities is by definition difficult to measure causing 
controversy surrounding any reported estimates. The terms: ‘black’/ ‘cash’/ ‘dual’/ 
‘hidden’/  ‘informal’/ ‘irregular’/ ‘moonlight’/ ‘non-observed’/ ‘non-official’/ ‘second’/ 
‘shadow’/ ‘subterranean’/ ‘twilight’/ ‘underground’/ ‘unmeasured’/ ‘unofficial/  ‘unrecorded’/ 
‘unreported’/ ‘untaxed’/ economy are close to being synonyms, with their very number 
suggesting the economic importance of the phenomenon they describe. However definitions 
do vary and in different contexts different terms may be more or less appropriate. For 
example, the ‘unmeasured’ or ‘unrecorded economy’ draws attention to the implication that 
official statistics and their use for policy purposes may be suspect if there are measurement 
failures. Beyond this the current urgent need to raise increased revenue to reduce 
budget deficits and the related need to encourage economic growth have become two 
of the most pressing issues in the international political economy, especially in the 
European Union (EU). ‘Unreported’ income reduces the potential income tax revenue 
for Governments across the world, where many of them are typically struggling to 
control their budget deficits. In addition legislation to counteract this problem cannot 
be introduced until the size and complexity of the ‘cash economy’ (the term selected 
here and defined below) is better understood. As yet attempts to measure the extent of 
this problem have produced varying estimates, which can be from between less than 
1% to well in excess of 15% of the total economic output. The aim in this study is to 
suggest a novel measurement methodology to measuring the extent and significance 
of this aspect of an economy. 
 There are difficulties in assessing the normative significance to the magnitude of the 
cash economy. At one extreme, authors see a one for one loss of tax revenue over 
what it would otherwise have been raised typified in ‘tax gap’ type calculations. At 
the other extreme the cash economy is seen as a ‘good thing’ serving as a mechanism 
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to curb the powers of a Leviathan state (see Cullis and Jones, 2009). Overlaid on these 
arguments is the widespread belief that some cultures and countries are much more 
prone to be dishonest than others.  
 The main aim of the study is to use the formation of the European single currency in 
1999 as a mechanism for measuring the size and significance of the cash economy in 
the EU. This paper focuses in particular on the relative importance of the cash 
economy in some Eurozone countries in the lead up to monetary integration using two 
other European Union (EU) countries and the USA as control economies. The 
underlying approach, elaborated below, dates back to authors such as Feige (1989) 
and Tanzi (1982), however the method is different in that it is essentially an event 
study (for a description of different methods see Schneider and Enste, 2000)1. This 
paper relies on the observation that ‘Shadow economy transactions tend to be in cash’ 
(Schneider and Enste, 2002: 7). 
Following the introduction, section 2 sets the context of the study reported here, 
section 3 outlines the theory behind the measurement of the cash economy and section 
4 outlines the different EU housing markets and section 5 the empirical approach 
used. Sections 6, 7 and 8 discuss the data and interpret the results before concluding. 
2.  The literature on the ‘non-official’ economy 
As noted above interest in the non-official economy is very considerable. This is not 
only for the practical reason of trying to finance public sectors and conduct 
macroeconomic policy in an equitable and efficient way but also because it is a rich 
area for both novel social science theorising and empirical work. A recent special 
issue of Public Finance Review (Alm and Prinz (eds) (2013) explicitly recognises the 
                                               
1 Other related studies have analysed the economics of the related topic of money laundering, these 
include Masciandaro (1999). 
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connection between the shadow economy, tax evasion and money laundering in that 
all (untaxed) money earned outside the official economy to be useful must somehow 
be brought back into the official economy.  Further a recent special issue of the 
Journal of Economic Psychology (Muehlbacher, Pickhardt and Prinz (eds) 2014) on 
Behavioral Dynamics of Tax Evasion emphasises interdisciplinary and multi-
methodological work. The editors note: “A trend in tax research is the general 
acceptance of new methods.” (Muehlbacher et. al. 2014: iv). Work reported in the 
special issue varies from the use of recently developed econometric techniques and 
experiments to applying the Ising model of ferromagnetism, from physics, to tax 
evasion dynamics. Additionally the role of emotions such as shame, sympathy and 
empathy are explored in the tax evasion context alongside agent based models that 
analyse artificial societies with different interaction and network structures. In 
contrast  to these studies the work reported here, in part, harks back to an older 
consideration but sets it in a new specific context where money really ‘must’ be 
brought back into the official economy. The choice of the term ‘cash’ economy 
highlights “its use as a medium of exchange and a store of value in the ‘underground’ 
economy. One of the key attributes of currency is anonymity, since its usage does not 
leave a paper trail. As such it is the preferred medium for purchasing illegal goods and 
for hiding income that should be, but is not reported to the tax authority.” (Feige, 
2012: 244). In his (2012) study Feige explores the paradox that despite financial 
innovation which seemed to herald a cashless economy US real per capita currency 
holding had increased over the twenty years to 2009 by 59%, to some $2,700, in a 
context where households and businesses only admit to holding about 15% of the 
actual US currency supply. This is the ‘currency enigma’ of ‘missing dollars’. Whilst 
some of the missing dollars can be found in the process of ‘dollarization’ (overseas 
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holdings of dollars as a hard currency) the ‘new’ figure reported above is a domestic 
one being net of this ‘dollarization’ sum which the author calculates has been 
significantly overestimated in the past. In responding to some of the criticisms of 
Feige’s (1989) general currency ratio model Cebula and Feige (2012) use Feige’s new 
estimates of domestic US currency holding in estimating that some 18-19% of US 
total reportable income goes unreported.  It is the idea of making ‘missing dollars’ or 
more generally ‘missing cash’ visible and measurable that motivates the remainder of 
this paper.  
    
3.  Theory: “too much cash” 
It is noticeable that if you live in the bed and breakfast area of a tourist city how much 
gold jewellery adorns landladies, how many new watches landlords have and how 
often perfectly good windows are replaced. This seemingly excessive acquisition of 
personal property (personalty) and real property (realty) is typically attributed to the 
cash economy where landladies and landlords have different mental or even physical 
boxes in some cases where earnings are placed. These boxes are labelled ‘income for 
the tax man’ and ‘income for me’. The trouble with ‘cash income for me’ is that there 
is no easy way to use it without signalling to the tax man that your life style seems 
incommensurate with your ‘declared’ taxable income, causing suspicion and possible 
investigation. On the other hand for cash income to have utility it must hold out the 
possibility of exchange for goods and services. This kind of scenario covers one 
aspect of the cash economy involving the output of goods and services that are legal 
(providing bed and breakfast services) but where the production or distribution 
process involves some illegality (failure to declare income to the tax authorities). 
Working for cash–in-hand and working off-the- books are similar types of activity. 
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This is Thomas’ (1992) ‘irregular sector’. The other area of economies where cash is 
dominant is in the criminal sector were the goods and services being produced and 
traded are illegal2 in them selves (eg. certain drugs, prostitution). The main issue for 
the successful criminal who manages to accumulate a great deal of cash is how to 
conceal it from the authorities whist gaining access to goods and services from it. 
Typically they are seen as trying to ‘launder’ cash into the legitimate economy.  In 
short the landlady has a tax evasion problem and the drug dealer has a money 
laundering one. What is termed the cash economy here then comprises Thomas’ 
irregular and criminal sectors. Unger (2013) discusses how the definition of money 
laundering has evolved with a precondition for criminalising money laundering being 
a criminal ‘predicate offence’. If both drug dealing and tax evasion are considered a 
‘predicate offence’ as in the, G-7 1989 established, Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF) standards then both are subsumed under money 
laundering. Unger (2013: 662) suggests that “A merging of the definition of tax 
evasion and money laundering (and perhaps parts of the shadow economy) might help 
overcome the problems of measuring different sorts of illicit financial activities that 
have always been difficult to distinguish neatly.”. In a way the work reported below 
empirically reflects such a ‘merging’. 
 
Unlike definitions of the ‘shadow’ or ‘underground’ economy this study excludes 
non- monetary transactions3. If these observations on the cash economy carry weight 
then at any point in time the major actors involved are rationed to hold too much cash 
in their net wealth portfolios. Such cash is referred to as ‘tainted’ below. Indeed the 
                                               
2 What is illegal can vary substantially from economy to economy.  
3 Other theoretical studies have approached modelling the black economy from other perspectives, for instance 
Huang and Wu (1994) model this phenomenon with respect to the ‘social norm’ approach. 
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common phrase that you ‘cannot have too much money’ is erroneous if you are 
rationed. Whilst typically in economics the axiom of ‘free disposal’ guarantees all 
rationing takes place on the ‘short’ side, in the cash economy it is the case that ‘forced 
retention’ is likely to arise. In an asset approach to the demand for cash, where money 
is seen as a durable capital good (see Friedman 1956) it is typical to see net wealth 
holders as having a portfolio of assets that can take a real, monetary or human capital 
form.  In an asset approach to the demand for cash, where money is seen as a durable 
capital good (see Friedman 1956) it is typical to see net wealth holders as having a 
portfolio of assets that can take a real, monetary or human capital form. That is: 
 
                                 W = R + F + HC                  (1) 
 
Where: 
W = net or total wealth; 
R = real assets eg. housing property; 
F = financial assets eg. cash money; 
HC = human capital eg. training.        
 
In this context money is viewed as a temporary abode of purchasing power generating 
an expected stream of future services. In the cash economy the illegal source of cash 
almost by definition has to be a semi-permanent abode of purchasing power as 
optimal portfolio adjustments are precluded. In asset theory an equilibrium involves 
the purchase of each asset up to the point where the present value of the future income 
stream equals the price of the asset type. In Friedman’s formulation the demand for 
money is a function of the form: 
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                         L = f(re, rse, pe, HC/W, P, W)                 (2) 
                                  -     -     -       +       +   + 
Where new terms are: 
L= demand for money; 
re = expected rate of returns on bonds;  
rse = expected rate of return on stocks; 
.pe = expected inflation rate; 
HC/W = ratio of human capital to total wealth; 
P = permanent price level. 
 
The predicted signs of the variables in the function on the demand for money are 
indicated under the variables. The simple model postulated here is that the utilty of a 
cash economy actor depends on the quantities of the three assets, one of which Fm is 
constrained at a supra optimal level. So the actor is seen to maximize: 
                                                                                    
Max{U(R,Fm,HC  PrR + PfFm + PhcHC = W, Fm = Fm>Fm*}             (3) 
 
Where Pr, Pf and Phc are the ‘prices’ of real, financial and human capital assets 
respectively and Fm* is the equilibrium portfolio holding of Fm.  
Forming a Lagrangean: 
                                                                                     
L = U(R,Fm,HC) + (W - PrR + PfFm + PhcHC) + ( Fm - Fm* + S)    (4) 
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Where the third term is the rationing constraint. The first order condition relevant to 
this analysis is for the surfit asset as it contains an extra term : 
  
L/Fm =  U/Fm - Pf  +  = 0 
 
Recognising this and making the discussion tractable as well as fitting more closely 
the empirical work discussed below consider figure 1. In the figure there are only two 
assets cash (Y) and a real asset taken to be real estate or more loosely housing (H). 
The unconstrained equilibrium, with budget constraint 1-2 is point 3 on I3. However 
consistent with the rationing constraint described above the rationed equilibrium is 
point 4 on I2 where the individual has yr cash and hr housing. As drawn, the individual 
is indifferent between point 4 and point 5 where the individual has adjusted the 
quantities of each asset but only by incurring laundering costs that shift the budget 
constraint to line 6-7 rendering the adjustment a matter of indifference. Indications of 
laundering costs are gleaned from a number of sources. For example Grossman 
(1982) reports that in the Soviet Union one way used to launder cash was to buy 
winning lottery tickets that had yet to be cashed in.  Launderers had to pay 1.5 to 2 
times the size of the lottery win. That is 1.5 to 2 units of ‘tainted’ money to 1 unit of 
legal money.      
 Francis (1988) describes ‘smurfing’ where innocent looking, non-descript elderly 
women are employed to make smallish ‘tainted’ cash deposits in bank accounts at a 
large number of banks. Once in the banks the money can be electronically moved 
around. The fee for this task is reported to range from between 7% and 15% of the 
amount laundered. More recently the OECD (2009) notes: “Real estate has long been 
the preferred choice of criminals for hiding ill-gotten gains, and manipulating 
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property prices is one of the oldest ways to transfer proceeds illegally between parties 
to a deal.” (OECD 2009:31). The attractions include the relative high purchase prices, 
possible capital gains and the ability to hide ownership. They describe ‘property 
flipping’ where two or more transactions take place fairly close together. The seller 
receives the market value of the property but agrees to accept part of the valuation in 
‘tainted cash’. The legal documents record the lower official price which has 
legitimate finance. The buyer subsequently sells the property for its market value and 
has appeared to have made a capital gain (equal to the money laundered in). Unger 
and Ferwerda (2011) similarly consider the real estate sector as one experiencing 
money laundering problems and using a set of seventeen characteristics (eg. unusual 
price fluctuations) empirically identify houses or business premises in two Dutch 
cities that looked suspicious in the light of the characteristics.           
  
 Returning to Fig. 1 assuming laundering costs that are marginally above distance 1-6 
the rationed equilibrium at 4 remains in force and cash economy actors have almost 
by definition a great deal of cash at any point in time. What event might disturb this 
rationed equilibrium? The answer here is a catastrophic change in the price of holding 
Y. If domestically denominated cash has a price rise tending to infinity, then the 
utility maximizer is forced to adjust. The key point in this section is that a credible 
commitment to replace domestic currency with the Euro is just such a catastrophic 
price change. At a known date in the future cash holding denominated in domestic 
currency will only have an antique market value. Like it or not the rationing constraint 
has to be broken and other assets acquired but which ones? In the fuller account this 
depends on the relative cross elasticity of substitution between human capital and real 
property. It is likely that this elasticity value is greater for real property than for 
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human capital so the adjustment postulated is to a point such as the one labelled point 
10 on I0 where the individual has only their justified holding of cash (ye) and a great 
deal more real property (he). The budget line has moved to 8-9 to reflect enforced 
laundering costs of adjustment. If such an account is typical of the majority of actors 
in the cash economy there should be a rapid and very large increase in the demand for 
real property and the illegal holding of cash can, other things being equal, be gauged 
from the capitalisation process that will take place.   
 In Fig. 2 a simple picture of the housing market is portrayed. Housing as an asset is 
long lived hence net investment in any year or quarter tends to be a tiny proportion of 
the existing stock. Given this, the supply of housing (Sh) is seen as perfectly inelastic 
at a quantity q0. Ironically equilibrium in stock dominated markets involves an 
equilibrium price but no trades. In Fig. 2 D0 is the pre-existing demand for the stock 
of houses and P0 the equilibrium price. With D0 and Sh the market clearing price is P0 
consistent with point 1. At that price d0 is the demand curve for non-house owners and 
WTS (the willingness to supply curve) of housing comprising the reservation prices of 
those individuals who own houses. 
  The ‘willingness to supply’ curve is simply the mirror image of D0  being the trace of 
the reservation values beginning with the lowest and working up to the highest. With 
WTS equalling d0 at P0 the market will be ‘thin’ but nevertheless in equilibrium. 
Assuming that the distances yr  to ye from Fig. 1 are grossed up over all participants in 
the cash economy it will provide a quantity of tainted money to be laundered into 
houses. As the quantity is a given sum it seems reasonable to represent the new ‘on 
announcement’ demand (Dn) for houses as a rectangular hyperbola. This change 
implies that qn of the housing stock will change hands at a price of P1 set by point 2. 
The area 0- P1 – 2 - qn is an estimate of the ‘tainted’ cash in the economy.  
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 That is cash that is being held as a store of value but more likely as the support for 
illegal activities. Note that this analysis implies that all newly observed house trades 
are those undertaken by cash economy participants and as such trading would 
immediately identify you as a money launderer. In reality the market for the stock of 
real estate will obviously be more complex than this as each period some trades will 
reflect individual changes of reservation prices making observed housing expenditure 
in the relevant period a certain overestimate of the stock of tainted money. However 
there may nevertheless be a case for using that sum as an approximation. In a more 
complex picture not all such cash will go to housing but to other unanalysed assets 
whose prices should also increase. For exposition if this heroic assumption is accepted 
then area 0- P1 – 2 - qn is a ‘ball park’ estimate of the ‘tainted’ cash in the economy (= 
Ct). This estimate of the stock of cash when multiplied by a suitable velocity of 
circulation of tainted money (Vt) would provide an estimate of the size of the cash 
economy expenditure (Et = Ct .Vt).  
There is evidence that cash economy participants, especially criminals, have a 
preference for property. Cocaine money seems to have been invested in real estate so 
that by the end of the 70’s it appeared that 40% of real estate transactions above 
$300,000 in Dade county (which includes Miami) came via off-shore corporations 
associated with cash laundering (Thomas, (1992). This 40% might be applied to Ct in 
a sensitivity calculation. As regards the velocity of circulation of ‘tainted’ cash (Vt) 
there are opposing arguments. If cash is being held as a store of value as well as a 
medium of exchange then the velocity of circulation of ‘tainted’ money will be lower 
than that of cash in the legal economy (Cagan, 1958). On the other hand in the cash 
economy the recording and monitoring of transactions is avoided making more 
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transactions per monetary unit attractive. Again sensitivity calculations might be a 
way forward.    
Reverting to the individual level point 10 in Fig. 1 is unlikely to be the final 
equilibrium as once the cash is laundered into housing further adjustment lowering the 
holding of housing at a cost represented in the movement of the budget constraint to 
11-12 allows a utility maximizer to achieve equilibrium at point 13 on I1.The general 
prediction is that having laundered the cash into property the process will be reversed 
to an extent to convert housing property into euros giving a pattern of property prices. 
That is the trend asset price of housing will be displaced upwards until the euro is in 
circulation in the relevant countries. 
 If the arguments above are to be more than theoretical speculation then at least some 
of the steps in the analysis have to be empirically observed or proxied. These are the 
tasks of later sections. However before looking at the data it is worthwhile to place the 
key variables, housing markets in different countries, into context.   
 
4.  European Housing Markets and the European Single Currency 
 When considering a model of EU house prices, the nature of the housing market 
needs to be taken into consideration. As Maclennan et al. (1998) have suggested, 
housing markets across the EU are very diverse in a number of ways.  The main 
difference concerns the levels of home ownership, but other differences include how 
the housing is financed, regulations on mortgages and the mortgage industry and how 
housing is taxed and subsidised. A further complication over recent years has 
concerned the levels of non-residents owning homes in different countries, either as a 
holiday home or as an investment. Clearly since the single currency has been 
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introduced, this has increased, especially in some Mediterranean countries such as 
Spain. 
 The housing markets across the EU can be broadly divided into those markets which 
are based around owner-occupiers and those which rely on the private rented sector, 
where house price data tends to be more limited. The UK, Ireland and Spain have 
among the highest levels of owner occupation in the EU and correspondingly high 
levels of mortgage finance. For instance in the UK about 70% of homes are owner 
occupied, whilst at the other extreme in Germany it is less than 50%. Clearly the 
structure of the housing market in the individual countries will affect how house 
prices respond to income and interest rates, as well as preparation for the Euro.  
 Another important feature of the EU housing market is that over the last decade 
countries have retained control of fiscal policy in general and taxation in particular. In 
addition mortgages are taxed differently across the EU, with some countries having 
tax deductibility on mortgage payments. As a result of the differences we would not 
expect the housing markets across the EU to react in the same way to the economic 
changes implied by the introduction of the Euro. For some economies laundering 
tainted money into the asset housing will be more attractive than in others.    
 A further source of divergence across the EU relates to the way in which mortgage 
finance is constrained in some countries. These constraints are usually imposed as 
part of the prudential requirements for the financial sector and typically involve limits 
on the loan to house value. In most countries the limit is below 100% of the house 
value, although in the UK during the early 2000s mortgages well over this amount 
were allowed.  Traditionally in countries such as Germany and France the limit has 
been nearer 60%, which again has limited the levels of home ownership.  In addition 
during the 1990s and 2000s the way in which housing was financed changed for some 
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countries, especially the UK and Ireland, with the rise of securitisation of housing 
debt and holding the debt in off balance sheet vehicles. In some countries such as 
Spain this was made illegal, to prevent the collapse of house prices and the financial 
sector experienced in the UK and Ireland during the end of 2007. 
 As noted by Muellbauer (1992) not only does the housing market and macroeconomy 
have a close relationship, but also due to the differences across the EU housing 
markets, a uniform reaction in house prices to changes in either interest rates or 
economic growth would not be expected. In addition it would not be expected that all 
countries produce the same ‘cash economy’ effect on joining the Euro in 1999. For 
instance some countries such as Spain with a large overseas interest in their housing 
economy, the ‘cash economy’ effect could be drowned out by the effect of potential 
overseas buyers waiting until the Euro was set up, then buying the property to avoid 
any exchange rate risk. 
 The move to a European Single Currency (Euro) began in 1991 with the Maastricht 
Treaty.  This also set five criteria which all potential member states needed to pass 
before they were allowed to join. The criteria related to important monetary and fiscal 
measures and were aimed at ensuring all member state’s economies had converged 
sufficiently before the single currency could be formed. In May 1998 eleven 
European countries had passed these criteria and joined, of those who wished to join 
only Greece failed to pass the criteria, but subsequently joined in 2002 having met the 
requirements. The UK also decided not to join and remained outside the ERM.  
Between January 1999 and December 2001, national currencies remained in 
circulation as notes and coins, but at irrevocably fixed exchange rates. However bank 
accounts could be in Euros and all transactions between the European Central bank in 
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Frankfurt and individual commercial banks were in Euros. Then between January and 
July of 2002 national currencies were replaced by the Euro.4 
 
5.  An Econometric Model of Property Price Determination 
 The model used for the estimation is a standard house price model in which house 
prices are determined by economic growth and interest rates, as Case and Shiller 
(1989) suggest these tend to be two of the most widely used house price determinants. 
A dummy variable representing the window between the announcement of those 
countries included in the Euro and its implementation has also been included to test 
whether there was any evidence of excess returns during this time period. This is a 
similar approach to the use of event studies, where dummy variables are used to 
measure the effects of a policy change or announcement. In this case instead of using 
the market model of asset returns, we use a simple model of house prices and 
incorporate the dummy variable into this. Similar approaches include Frot and Santiso 
(2013) who test for the effects of political changes on flows of capital into stock 
markets. Due to the differences in housing markets across the EU it was decided to 
keep the empirical model as simple as possible, concentrating on the effects most 
likely to be relevant in all countries studied. As with similar literature on event 
studies5, the house price is in growth form as is the output measure. In effect the 
                                               
4 For a detailed description of the formation and management of the Euro, De Grauwe (2000) has a comprehensive 
coverage. 
5 Event studies are typically carried out using stock price data and involving either a market model or a form of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). A specific policy change is then used incorporating dummy variables to 
determine if it had a significant effect on the stock price. This approach has similarities in that instead of the return 
on stock prices, the return on house prices is used. However interpretation of the dummy variable is similar in this 
case. 
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house prices are in return form and thus stationary. The econometric model estimated 
is: 
 
  tttt udummyiliplhp  3210     (5) 
 
 Where hpt are the respective real house price measure, ipt is real industrial production 
(both in logarithms), it is the long-term interest rate, Δ indicates a differenced variable 
and dummyt is the dummy variable taking the value of zero except for quarters three 
and four in 19986. This was chosen as the window as it represents the time between 
when it was announced who could join the Euro and when it came into being. In May 
1998 the decision on who had passed the Maastricht criteria was taken and was 
therefore allowed to join the Euro, then in January 1999 the Euro came into existence. 
Between these two dates it is most probably that the move into property would most 
likely have taken place. If the ‘cash economy’ effect is the case, then a positive and 
significant coefficient on the dummy variable would be anticipated. 
 
6.  The Data, Results and Discussion  
 The countries used for the estimation include four members of the European single 
currency where the announcement effect is predicted. The member states included for 
this purpose are the Netherlands and Ireland, representing Northern Europe, France in 
                                               
6 However this event is likely to have been a leaky one, with some individuals anticipating that their countries 
would be allowed to join before May 1998. As a result other windows were included in the model, for instance 
with the ‘window’ of ones from 1991 (signing of Maastricht treaty) to 1999, however these tended not to work as 
well as the ‘window’ used. Finding the appropriate ‘window’ length is a common problem with event type studies, 
as there is no set way of determining it, the approach used here has been based on policy changes as well as the 
best empirical fit. 
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the middle and Spain which represent southern Europe7. In order to have some control 
countries where no significant coefficient on the dummy variable would be 
anticipated other comparator countries were ‘tested’. They can be divided into internal 
to the EU controls and an external to the EU control. The internal controls are Sweden 
and the UK. The external control country with no links to the EU is the USA. The 
data is all quarterly, except the USA which has monthly data, but the data ranges from 
1978 q1 for Ireland to 2008 q4. However due to lack of data the estimation for the 
other countries was over a more limited time span. For the other countries the data 
begins in 1985 and 1986 for the Netherlands and Sweden respectively and 1995 and 
1996 for Spain and France respectively. 
 In this study industrial production has been used rather Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), again due the lack of quarterly data for some countries. The interest rate is the 
return on long-tern Government bonds, as this tends to be similar to the rate for 
mortgages. The dummy variable takes the value of zero except the last two quarters of 
1998. This is to reflect the time span immediately prior to the formation of the single 
currency in 1999 and the announcement in May 1998 of those countries that had 
satisfied the Maastricht criteria and so were allowed to join.  
 
The results of estimating equation (5) are recorded in Table 1. The key question is 
whether there is an announcement effect present in the estimates. The dummy 
                                               
7 A potential alternative to the individual time series approach used here, would have been to construct a panel of 
these countries. This was used in Goodhart and Hofmann (2006) to determine causality between the housing 
market and other macroeconomic factors.  However there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity across these 
EU housing markets as noted earlier, which would induce bias into our estimates. In addition we are not expecting 
this effect to be relevant in all the countries in this sample, so the time series is more suited to our overall aims. 
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variables are significant in all specifications except Sweden, UK and the USA as 
expected as these are the control countries. For the Netherlands, France and Ireland 
the dummy variable is positively signed suggesting a rise in house prices immediately 
before the single currency was formed. The coefficient on the dummy variable can be 
interpreted as the abnormal return on holding the housing asset during the last six 
months of 1999. Ireland has the highest value and France the lowest, suggesting over 
the six months Ireland enjoyed a 0.045% return above what would have been 
expected.   
 For Spain the effect is negative, however it can be argued that the Spanish housing 
market during this time fundamentally differed to that in the rest of the EU, as there 
was a substantial demand for holiday homes in Spain from outside Spain and across 
the EU. However many potential buyers were waiting until the single currency was in 
place as they believed this would make purchase easier and remove currency risk. 
They therefore delayed buying, so driving the price down temporarily. The other main 
determinants of house prices are more mixed in terms of the result. Only in the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, UK and the USA is output a significant and positive 
determinant of house prices, whilst only Spain and Ireland have a significant and 
negative effect from interest rates. This last result reflects the greater importance of 
home ownership and mortgages in these countries relative to the other ones included 
in the study. Data permitting, the method employed here can be extended to new 
members of the Eurozone8.  
                                                                                                                                      
Another alternative would be to use microeconometric approaches, however again there was no suitable data on a 
micro level available. 
8 An attempt to quantify the size of the cash economy can be based on these estimates. Taking the Netherlands as 
an example, our estimates indicate an excess return of 7,000 Euros over the two quarters. With approximately 
100,000 homes sold over this time period and assuming that all the excess return was used as a medium of 
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7.   Corroborative Evidence on the ‘Cash Economy’ 
How do the results obtained here ‘fit’ with other evidence on the size of informal 
economies? The rankings for the cash economy effects from the results would be 
Ireland, Holland, France. Estimates of the informal economy are often used to proxy 
the relevance of tax evasion in different countries. When reviewing the OECD 
countries there is a stark contrast between the sizes of informal sectors.  
The unfortunately named PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) economies feature 
high on the rankings of informal sectors being 5th, 2nd, 1st and 4th respectively. Only 
Belgium breaks up a Southern European pattern. Do the results obtained appear to be 
consistent with this picture? Ireland, France and the Netherlands are neatly placed and 
somewhat supportively ranked11th, 12th and 13th but the order for the Netherlands and 
France are reversed compared to the abnormal returns results. Spain as noted above is 
the ‘outlier’ result.     
Torgler and Schneider (2007) use a tax morality variable from the World Values 
Survey in their study. The variable is based on responses to the general question: 
“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always 
be justified, never be justified. Or something in between (…) Cheating on tax if you 
have the chance.” are coded into ranks ranging from 1 = Never justifiable to 10 = 
Always justifiable. This is essentially an attitudinal question relating to the morality 
of tax evasion as opposed to a behavioural one and can be construed as data on norm 
strength of tax honesty in various countries. There is an obvious problem in that only 
code 1 corresponds to complete honesty as regards tax paying while the remainder are 
increasing degrees of dishonesty. Table 2 provides two measures of country 
                                                                                                                                      
exchange, it implies about 14 million Euros were laundered. Assuming a M0 velocity of about 32, it suggests 
about 0.12% of annual GDP being in the cash economy. 
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dishonesty. The first is the sum of codes 2 to 10 – a stringent measure of dishonesty - 
and the second treats all respondents coded 1-5 as ‘honest’ (a sort of democratic 50% 
view of honesty!) leaving codes 6 to 10 as the dishonesty measure. 
Here the evidence is less supportive. The rankings in the econometric results Ireland, 
Holland, France go to Holland, France, Ireland on Codes 2 to 10 and France, Holland, 
Ireland on Codes 6 to 10 however the scores do suggest a ‘closeness’ between France 
and Holland compared to Ireland. The fact that three of the PIGS economies rank 10th 
,11th and 14th of the 15 may cause some eyebrows to be raised!  
The illustrated method documented here produced a low figure for the cash economy 
as the certain underestimate (see footnote 8) of its size as it only considers one asset. 
Some recent evidence is however supportive. Takala and Viren (2010) confirm a 
figure for the shadow economy in Finland close to that of Nurminen (2008) with 
magnitudes of about 1.5% of GDP. These estimates contrast with the Schneider 
(2002, 2005) estimates of 15-25% of GDP and such a ‘gap’ is not easily explained. It 
may be relevant to note very marked differences in scale between estimated figures 
for the shadow economy as a whole (hidden activities) and illegal activities. Alm and 
Embaye (2013) use dynamic panel estimates to give measures of the size of shadow 
economies for 111 countries. For the Netherlands in 2006 the shadow economy is 
estimated at 14.8% of GDP.  Kazemeir et. al. (2013) estimate that in 2008 the total 
contribution of illegal activities to the national income of the Netherlands was some 
0.6% with a suggested error bound of plus or minus 0.3%. Around 40% of this total 
was drugs whereas illegal employment some 33%.  Like many other countries the UK 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) has started to include illegal activities (drugs and 
prostitution) in the GDP accounts altering recent economic history (O’Connor, 2014). 
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This allows a comparison with the Netherlands data. The Alm and Embaye (2013) 
shadow economy figure for the UK is 17.2% for 2006 while the ONS measures of 
illegal activities in 2009 were prostitution £5.3 bn and drugs £4.4 bn amounting to 
0.7% of GDP. These, admittedly imperfect, estimates make the ratio of the illegal 
economy to shadow economy 0.04 in both the Netherlands and the UK.  At first blush 
the estimate reported here seem broadly consistent with estimates of the share of 
illegal activities in GDP perhaps suggesting the housing market is an attraction to 
those wanting to launder the proceeds of illegal activities as opposed to tax evaders. 
However this is a conjecture awaiting further analysis not least because the ONS used 
some data from the Netherlands e.g. €0.50 a client on condoms in 2007.   
 
8. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 An important concern for policy makers across the EU and many other industrialised 
economies is how to raise more tax revenue to bring their budget deficits under 
control and in this study we find evidence that the ‘cash economy’ is a significant 
problem within the EU and a potential source of large amounts of extra tax. We model 
it from a theoretical and empirical standpoint using property prices in conjunction 
with the move to the European single currency in 1999. Using a dummy variable 
between the announcement of the Euro’s members and the implementation of the 
Euro, we find it has a significant effect for all the members of the Euro except Spain. 
As a control we have also used countries that are not part of the Euro and find in all 
cases the effect is not significant. 
Smith (1986:108) claims that “Estimates of the size of the black economy based on 
cash indicators are best ignored.” Whist the empirical work reported here is not all 
conquering the exercise does offer a measure of support for the theoretical 
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speculations in Section 3 and is based on this behaviour. In a way the credible 
announcement to join the Euro enacted a recommendation made by Henry (1976). He 
noted the growth in demand for large denomination dollar bills and advocated 
periodic recalling of such bills to prevent ‘tainted’ cash being held in this way. Those 
dealing in the cash economy would need to justify their holdings of large amounts of 
cash in high denomination bills in order to have an equivalent amount of cash 
returned to them in new bills. The idea was to throw gravel in the wheels of the cash 
economy.  
The investigation discussed above does not share some of the weaknesses associated 
with earlier cash based estimates of the shadow economy. It does not rely on the 
convenience of large denomination notes9. It does not require a base year where the 
shadow economy was believed to be near zero or an official estimate was deemed 
accurate. It avoids use of a cash deposit ratio and in attempting to isolate the cash as 
opposed to the irregular economy it accepts wholeheartedly Thomas’ (1992: 149) 
comment: “While it may be plausible to assume that cash is the sole medium of 
exchange for people working in the irregular sector, this is even more likely to be true 
for anyone operating in the criminal sector.” It seems “Pinning down the informal 
economy is as tough as catching a fake Louis Vitton vendor running from the police” 
(Barnes, 2009). Given this degree of difficulty the impression of the cash economy 
glimpsed above may have merit.  For a specialist housing economist, familiar with the 
data and institutional structure of their economy furnishing a more precise calculation 
                                               
9 In this respect it is interesting to note that Professor Willem Buiter claims that the high denomination euro bank 
notes (200 and 500 bills) are “making the euro the currency of choice for underground and black economies …” 
and that Feige (2012) reports how the US fraction of the money stock made up of $100 bills grew from 20.9% in 
!963 to 73.3% in 2008. 
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would seem, on this evidence, a worthwhile task. If other ‘launderable’ assets are 
identified and measured then the methodology proposed here can be improved. 
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Figure 1. Individual Adjustment to an Announcement Effect 
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Figure 2. Housing Market Adjustment to an Announcement Effect 
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Table 1. Results from house price return model 
Country Constant Δip I Dummy Adj-R2 
France 
 
Holland 
 
Ireland 
 
Spain  
 
Sweden 
 
UK 
 
USA 
-0.004 
(1.641) 
0.005 
(0.519) 
0.027* 
(2.576) 
0.015** 
(1.854) 
0.021* 
(2.495) 
0.024* 
(2.272) 
0.003 
(0.665) 
0.010 
(0.122) 
0.270* 
(1.990) 
0.187** 
(1.882) 
1.321* 
(3.110) 
-0.002 
(0.089) 
0.429* 
(3.281) 
0.414* 
(3.361) 
0.004 
(0.076) 
0.080 
(0.485) 
-0.156** 
(1.682) 
-0.255* 
(2.468) 
-0.133 
(0.995) 
-0.153 
(1.268) 
-0.033 
(0.453) 
0.006* 
(5.555) 
0.019* 
(3.785) 
0.045* 
(7.411) 
-0.029* 
(3.124) 
-0.017 
(1.015) 
-0.005 
(0.832) 
0.001 
(0.537) 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.27 
 
0.00 
 
0.21 
 
0.08 
Notes: All models include HAC standard errors and covariances (Newey-West 
adjustment).A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 2 The ‘norm’ of dishonesty in 15 OECD – West European Countries 
different countries in 1999 
Country      Codes      Rank                 Codes                    Rank 
                  2 to 10                                6 to 10                                
 
Austria         41.4          12                     8.4                          13 
Belgium       61.3           1                      24.7                        1 
Denmark     34.4           15                     5.6                         14 
Germany     59.2           2                      18.3                        2 
Finland        44.8           8                       12.9                       4 
France         50.3           5                      17.2                        3 
GB               43.9           9                      9.8                          9 
Ireland         41.1           13                     8.5                         11= 
Italy              42.7          11                     9.7                         10 
Netherlands 53.7           3                     12.6                         5 
Norway        52.1           4                      12.2                        7 
Portugal       43.5          10                     11.7                        8 
Spain           35.9          14                      4.3                         15 
Sweden       49.1           6                       8.5                         11= 
Switzerland 45.4           7                       12.3                        6 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. House Price Index Sources 
 
Country Source 
France 
 
Netherlands 
Ireland 
 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
 
House Price Index from the National Institute for 
Statistics and Economic Studies 
House price Index from the NVM 
House price Index supplied by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute 
House price Index by the Banco de Espana 
House price Index from Statistics Sweden 
Financial Times House Price Index from the FT 
Case-Shiller House Price Index by S&P. 
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USA 
 
